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Abstract 
Using comprehensive corporate and retail loan data, we show that the corporate culture of 
banks explains their risk-taking behaviour. Banks whose corporate culture leans towards 
aggressive competition are associated with riskier lending practices: higher approval rate, 
lower borrower quality, and fewer covenant requirements. Consequently, these banks incur 
larger loan losses and make greater contributions to systemic risk. The opposite behaviour is 
observed among banks whose culture emphasises control and safety. Our findings cannot be 
explained by heterogeneity in a bank’s business model, CEO compensation incentives, and 
CEO characteristics. We use an exogenous shock to the US banking system during the 1998 
Russian default crisis to support a causal inference. 
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1. Introduction 
As part of the debate on banking industry reform, the corporate culture of banks is seen by 
many as a root cause of excessive bank risk-taking behaviour and the consequent instability in 
the financial system. The recent Wells Fargo scandal, for example, illustrates how the 
competitive culture of the bank induces its employees to take excessive risk to meet sale 
targets.1 The scandal echoes the common narrative among the press, regulators and 
practitioners that bank culture lies at the heart of bank risk-taking behaviour and plays a key 
role in influencing financial stability.2 Despite this popular narrative, empirical evidence on the 
relation between bank culture and its risk-taking behaviour remains scarce.  
Therefore, the objective of our study is to examine whether bank culture influences a 
specific risk-taking process – bank lending decisions.  In this way, we seek to contribute to the 
management literature that studies how corporate culture affects firm performance (e.g., 
Bezrukova et al., 2012; Chatman and Spatero, 2005; Ogbonna and Harris, 2000). In line with 
this literature, we focus on a specific industry (banking) and a specific behavioural process 
(lending decisions) to understand how bank culture operates to affect bank risk-taking and, 
ultimately, performance.  
Our focus on lending is motivated by several factors. First, despite technological 
advances, lending decisions remain inherently subjective. Banks still require credit officers to 
process, collate, and evaluate borrowers’ soft information.3 This implies that lending decisions 
                                                     
1 “Fed’s Dudley Says Wells Fargo Bank Culture Needs Improving”, Bloomberg, 21 March 2017. 
2 For instance, the UK’s Financial Conduct Authority planned to conduct a review on bank culture that is believed 
to contribute to a string of recent banking scandals (see “UK draws line under “banker bashing” after scrapping 
assessment” in Financial Times, 30 December 2015). Similarly, The Dutch Central Bank argues that the key to 
preventing financial crises and misconduct scandals may not be stricter regulations but to oversee culture and 
behaviour (De Nederlandsche Bank, 2015). In addition, Mr. William Dudley, the president and chief executive 
officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, has repeatedly emphasised that improving the culture of banks 
is the key to regain public trust on the financial industry. 
3 Although some parts of the lending process are automated, lending decisions need to be approved by credit 
officers and therefore, are subjected to discretion. The prior literature documents that lending outcomes can be 
determined by various characteristics of credit officers, including their psychological factors such as mood or 
emotional state (e.g., Cortes, Duchin, and Sosyura, 2016), compensation incentives (e.g., Cole, Kanz, and Klapper, 
2015), or career concerns (Filomeni, Udell, and Zazzaro, 2016). 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2789000 
 3 
can be heavily influenced by the norms around how loan applications are decided. Second, this 
setting enables us to exploit the granular nature of our corporate and retail loan datasets and 
provide micro-level evidence on how bank culture affects decision-making within the bank. 
Finally, as lending is the most fundamental activity of a bank, how lending decisions are made 
is likely to have a significant influence on the health of the bank and the financial system.  
Our measure of corporate culture is based on the Competing Value Framework (CVF). 
Developed by Quinn and Rohrbaugh (1983), the CVF identifies four corporate culture 
dimensions: compete, create, control and collaborate. These four cultural dimensions compete 
for a company’s limited financial, time and human resources. How the firm responds to the 
tension created by these competing values shapes its culture and, ultimately, the way people in 
the firm behave. 
Figure 1 summarises the attributes of these four cultural orientations. Compete and 
create cultures share a growth focus and place an emphasis on risk-taking, adaptability, 
competitiveness, and aggressiveness. Compete-oriented firms embrace risk-taking through 
aggressive competition and focus on customer demand. Create-oriented firms, while also 
embracing risk-taking, focus on innovation, vision, and constant change. On the other hand, 
collaborate and control cultures share a safety focus and place an emphasis on predictability, 
conformity, and compliance. These two dimensions can be seen as less focused on risk-taking. 
Control-oriented firms achieve predictability through a focus on control, efficiency, and 
process capability. Collaborate-oriented firms achieve predictability through harmony of 
people within the organisation.  
As lending is a major source of bank revenue and is characterised by high uncertainty, 
we hypothesise that banks with a growth focus (compete and create) are more aggressive when 
originating loans in exchange for revenue and growth. In contrast, we expect to find the 
opposite results in banks with a safety focus (control and collaborate). We examine the 
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influence of these culture measures on two key lending channels: corporate lending (syndicated 
loans) and retail lending (mortgage loans). 
To test this hypothesis, we measure corporate culture by applying textual analysis on 
the annual reports of all publicly-listed US banks (see Fiordelisi and Ricci (2014) for similar 
approaches). The premise of textual analysis is that the words used in the annual reports mirror 
the corporate culture that a company has developed over time. Specifically, we identify a set 
of keywords and their synonyms for each cultural dimension and compute the frequency that 
each set of words appears in the annual reports. 4 
Our analysis begins with corporate loans. We use the credit ratings of a bank’s 
borrowers to measure bank risk-taking in lending. Credit ratings reflect the borrower’s 
creditworthiness and ability to repay loans and, therefore, are key inputs that banks use to 
evaluate their borrowers. Consistent with our hypothesis, we find that banks with a growth 
focus culture are more likely to have borrowers with poorer credit ratings, while those with a 
safety focus are less likely to do so, with the effects concentrated on compete- and control-
dominant banks. Specifically, borrowers of compete-dominant banks are 3.0% more likely to 
be sub-investment grade borrowers (or “risky borrowers”, defined as unrated borrowers or 
those rated below BBB), while borrowers of control-dominant banks are 6.6% less likely to 
have sub-investment grade ratings. Our results are robust to controlling for many factors that 
could influence bank risk-taking, including a bank’s business models, CEO compensation, and 
CEO characteristics (e.g., demographic, education or career history), as well as borrower’s 
industry5 and state fixed effects. 
                                                     
4 This set of keywords used for measuring each cultural dimension is from Fiordelisi and Ricci (2014), who 
compile a large set of synonyms for each cultural dimension from those described in Cameron et al. (2006) and 
the Harvard IV-4 Psychosocial Dictionary. For instance, words like “fast, expand, performance, and win” are 
associated with compete culture, words like “envision, freedom, and venture” are associated with create culture, 
words like “cooperate, human, and partner” are associated with collaborate culture, and words like “monitor, 
competence, and long-term” are associated with control culture. 
5 Industry classifications are based on two-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) Code.  
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We also perform additional tests to buttress our interpretation that bank culture matters 
to its lending behaviour. Specifically, we find that bank culture also explains the changes in 
lending behaviour around an exogenous shock to the US banking sector during the 1998 
Russian default crisis (Section 4.2.1), and bank risk-taking in mortgage lending (Section 4.2.2). 
These tests allow us to alleviate the concern that our results are influenced by endogenous 
bank-borrower matching and to show that our results hold for the sample of all public banks. 
We further show that bank culture also affects the terms of loans. Consistent with our 
expectations that compete-dominant banks are more willing to assume default risk in exchange 
for revenue, we find that they require significantly fewer covenants from their borrowers while 
charging them a higher loan spread. In contrast, in line with their focus on safety, control-
dominant banks on average impose a higher number of covenant conditions, especially when 
the borrower is risky (i.e., unrated or rated below BBB).6 Overall, our findings imply that a 
bank’s culture influences how it trade-offs between lending standards and revenue. 
We next evaluate the overall risk and performance of these banks. First, we find that 
compete-dominant banks exhibit higher loan growth in normal times, and incur greater loan 
losses in distressed times.7 These results can be attributed to their riskier lending standards. 
Second, consistent with compete-dominant banks squeezing their capital buffer to facilitate 
their aggressive lending, we find that compete-dominant banks hold a significantly lower level 
of Tier-1 capital. Finally, we find that compete-dominant banks exhibit a significantly greater 
contribution to systemic risk, measured using ∆CoVaR developed by Adrian and 
Brunnermeier (2016)8. This link between culture and systemic risk can potentially be explained 
                                                     
6 We find evidence that create- and collaborate-dominant banks behave in a similar way to compete- and control-
dominant banks, respectively, but to a lesser extent. 
7 Consistent with this, we also find that compete-dominant banks halt their lending to risky borrowers following 
industry distress.  
8 𝛥𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑟 measures the estimated change in Value-at-Risk (VaR) of all financial institutions (systemic VaR) when 
one institution’s  Value-at-Risk changes from its normal state to its distress state. Essentially, 𝛥𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑟 measures 
the extent to which the distress of a financial institution contributes to the tail risk of the financial system.  
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by the interbank lending channel. That is, banks that incur a high-level of non-performing loans 
but do not have sufficient capital to absorb the incurred losses may have to borrow more 
frequently from the interbank markets and consequently create large risk spillovers to the 
financial system.   
In contrast, control-dominant banks incur a significantly lower level of non-performing 
loans, hold a higher level of Tier-1 capital, and thus, make a smaller contribution to systemic 
risk. Overall, our evidence shows that not only does a bank culture influence its individual risk 
but it also has the potential to affect the overall stability of the financial system.  
Our study contributes to the literature that explores how corporate culture influences 
performance (e.g., Sackman, 2011; Schneider, Ehrhart, and Macy, 2013; Wilderom, Glunk, 
and Maslowski, 2000). This literature focuses on the specific processes through which culture 
influences performance, for instance, through facilitating effective acquisition processes 
(Weber and Menipaz, 2003) or fostering inter-firm relationships (Beugelsdijk, Koen, and 
Noorderhaven, 2009). We contribute to this literature by illuminating a new channel through 
which culture affects performance: bank credit decisions. By focusing on firms operating in a 
single industry (banking) in one country (the US), we are able to control for confounding social, 
economic and political factors (Chatman and Jehn, 1994; Scheneider et al., 2013). This allows 
us to obtain a more credible estimation of the effect of bank culture on its risk-taking and 
performance outcomes.  
Next, to the best of our knowledge, our paper provides the first micro-level evidence 
showing that corporate culture matters in many aspects of bank lending decisions, ranging from 
loan approvals, loan terms, to loan pricing. Therefore, our study adds to empirical evidence on 
corporate culture of financial service firms (Chatman and Spatero, 2005; Dwyer, Richard, and 
Chadwick, 2003; Xenikou and Simosi, 2006). We show that the influence of corporate culture 
on bank lending transcends traditional characteristics of a bank’s business model, CEO 
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compensation incentives and CEO characteristics. Our findings are in line with the call from 
regulators to look beyond observable factors such as CEO pay in studying bank behaviour. 
Further, our results highlight the novel channels through which bank culture affects the overall 
stability of the financial system and therefore, have significant implications for bank managers, 
financial regulators, governance activists and policy-makers. 
Finally, we join recent works on corporate culture that use natural language processing 
on large datasets in order to measure corporate culture (e.g., Bianchi, Fariana, and Fiordelisi, 
2016; Fiordelisi and Ricci, 2014; Moniz, 2016; Popadak, 2013; Srivastava et al., 2018). This 
approach allows us to measure corporate culture of a large cross-sectional sample of banks 
compared to studies that survey small samples of firms (Chatman and O’Reilly, 2016). 
 
2. Literature and hypothesis 
2.1. Corporate culture – definitions and key perspectives  
Corporate culture is commonly defined as a set of beliefs, values, and assumptions shared 
among organisational members, which facilitates shared meaning and guide behaviour of 
organisational members (e.g., Hofstede, Neuijen, Ohayv, and Sanders, 1990; Schein, 1985).9 
Schein (1992) classifies the manners in which corporate culture can manifest itself into 
three levels: basic underlying assumptions, espoused beliefs and values, and artefacts.10 At the 
                                                     
9 Importantly, the concept of ‘culture’ is distinct from the concept of ‘climate’, where the latter is commonly 
defined as the “shared perceptions of and the meaning attached to the policies, practices, and procedures 
employees experience” (Schneider, Ehrhart, and Macey, 2013, p.362). That is, while corporate culture typifies the 
firm, corporate climate typifies employees’ perceptions of specific policies within the firm. We later explain why 
our culture measures are more likely to capture culture rather climate constructs. 
10 It is important to note that there are alternative definitions of corporate culture (see e.g., Hofstede et al., 1990; 
Martin, 1992; Pettigrew, 1979; Smircich, 1983). For instance, Ogbonna and Harris (1998) suggest that culture is 
currently presented in the literature as a mosaic of deep-rooted assumptions, values, and artefacts. Smircich (1985) 
proposes that corporations exist as a system of meanings, beliefs and taken-for-granted ideas that are shared by 
members of groups while Alvesson (2012) argues that culture is best understood by looking at the deep-level, 
non-conscious sets of meanings, ideas and symbolism. Other scholars whose work focuses on symbolic behaviour 
in organisations have pursued viewpoints that Schein overlooked (Alvesson, 2012; Kreiner, 1989; Smircich, 1983; 
Smircich and Morgan, 1982). Despite all these approaches to understanding corporate culture, as well as some of 
the discrepancies concerning various elements of Schein’s work, his framework remains useful for analysing 
corporate culture in the context of our paper. Specifically, Schein’s framework allows us to operationalise 
corporate culture from the integrationist perspective and compare culture of financial firms. 
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core level, culture consists of basic assumptions. These assumptions represent interpretive 
schemes that people use to make sense of ongoing situations, activities and human relationships 
and thereby establishing the basis for collective actions. Specific cultures exist when groups 
adopt similar interpretive schemes. At the second level, culture represents a set of values that 
define how organisational members interact and communicate. Therefore, compared to basic 
assumptions which tend to be invisible, values are more visible with individuals having a 
greater awareness of them. At the third level lie the most visible manifestation of culture – 
artefacts. These are visible and audible patterns, including language, technology, and rituals. 
For example, the language used in a firm’s annual reports can be considered as a cultural 
artefact that reflects the firm’s values and its basic assumptions.  
An important discussion in the corporate culture literature is whether firms have a 
monolithic culture or whether they have multiple subcultures, each with a distinct set of values. 
Martin (1992) draws this distinction in her discussions on three perspectives – integration, 
differentiation and fragmentation perspectives – of corporate culture.  
According to the integration perspective, corporate culture is a homogeneous collection 
of values that holds together a potentially diverse group of organisational members. It is a 
monolithic view of corporate life in which culture is considered to be harmonious and 
homogenous. In contrast, the differentiation perspective questions the idea of cultural 
homogeneity. Researchers writing from this perspective believe there are various local cultures 
that could co-exist within the firm, with each having its own distinctive values (e.g., Meyerson 
and Martin, 1987). Finally, the fragmentation perspective recognises that corporate cultures 
consist of multiple and competing interpretations that do not coalesce into a clear picture. 
In this paper, corporate culture is conceptualised from an integration perspective. This 
conceptualisation is consistent with Schein’s (2009) life-cycle theory which proposes that large 
and mature companies tend to have a corporate culture that reflects all parts of the firm as well 
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as multiple subcultures that reflect different functions within the firm. Since banks in our 
sample are large and mature, this implies that they are likely to have an overarching corporate 
culture. Our conceptualisation is further supported by Aldrich and Ruef (2006), who argue that 
while firms could develop subcultures, it does not necessarily imply that these firms do not 
simultaneously develop an overall culture. Furthermore, viewing banks as having a monolithic 
culture is also practically in line with our approach of measuring bank culture by applying 
textual analysis on the bank’s annual reports. Since the annual reports are at the bank-level, 
culture is naturally measured at the bank-level. 
2.2. The Competing Value Framework  
We construct our measures of corporate culture based on the Competing Value Framework or 
the CVF (Quinn and Rohrbaugh, 1983). While the CVF was initially constructed within the 
climate literature by Campbell (1977), subsequent scholars argue that the CVF also forms the 
typology of a corporate culture construct as it encapsulates “the different patterns of shared 
values, assumptions, and interpretations that typify organisations” (Cameron and Freeman 
1991, p. 27). This argument essentially relabels the CVF as a corporate culture construct 
(Chatman and O’Reilly, 2016), resulting in the CVF being operationalised as a culture 
construct in most subsequent studies (Hartnell, Ou, and Kinicky, 2011).  
Under the CVF, corporate culture is classified into four quadrants: compete, create, 
control, and collaborate. Each of these cultural quadrants is associated with different corporate 
orientations, value drivers, and effectiveness criteria as shown in Figure 1.  
The create and compete cultural dimensions share a growth focus. Firms that belong to 
these two quadrants place an emphasis on risk-taking, adaptability, competitiveness, and 
aggressiveness. Typically, firms in the compete dimension compete aggressively, with speed 
being an essential factor in maintaining the firm’s competitive advantage. In contrast, firms in 
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the create cultural dimension are associated with continuous change, entrepreneurship, and 
vision. The collaborate and control cultural dimensions share a safety focus. Firms that belong 
to these two dimensions place an emphasis on predictability, compliance, and safety. 
Organisational effectiveness of control-oriented firms is associated with capable processes, 
substantial predictability, and control. In contrast, firms in the collaborate dimension place 
emphasis on employee development and empowerment (Cameron et al., 2006). 
2.3 Bank culture and lending decisions  
We hypothesise that the corporate culture of banks matters to their lending decisions. Despite 
advances in credit-scoring technologies, credit decisions remain by and large activities that 
require substantial human inputs (Brown et al., 2012; Campbell, 2012; Filomeni, Udell, and 
Zazzaro, 2016). For instance, in order to make approval decisions, credit officers need to collate 
and evaluate borrowers’ soft information, such as the quality of their management team or the 
likelihood that their research and development activities will materialise and generate profits. 
Such decisions are inherently complex, subjective and therefore, cannot be regulated ex ante. 
To cope with such subjectivity, credit officers would need to rely on the norms within their 
own bank on what constitutes appropriate lending decisions (Rojot, 2009). Therefore, we 
hypothesise that the corporate culture of banks could affect their lending decisions. 
In what way does bank culture matter to lending behaviour? In lending to clients, banks 
consume various types of risk, most notably default risk, in exchange for revenue, market share, 
and growth. Default risk is a major concern for banks because it renders the bank’s ability to 
recover the payments. As a result, banks will not lend to marginal borrowers whom they deem 
unable to repay the loans. We hypothesise that compete-dominant banks are most willing to 
consume default risk in making lending decisions in exchange for immediate growth and 
revenue. In contrast, control-dominant banks focus on safety and therefore, will be least willing 
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to take risk in making lending decisions even if this comes at the expense of slower growth. 
Furthermore, we expect that create-dominant banks share some similar lending behaviour with 
compete-dominant banks as they both share a growth focus, while collaborate-dominant banks 
will behave similarly to safety focus control-dominant banks. 
Hypothesis 1A: Banks with compete- and create-dominant cultures are more 
likely to take risk in making lending decisions. 
Hypothesis 1B: Banks with control- and collaborate-dominant cultures are less 
likely to take risk in making lending decisions. 
 
3. Data and variables 
3.1. Measuring bank corporate culture 
Our objective is to identify corporate culture at the bank-level according to the CVF. We follow 
Fiordelisi and Ricci (2014) and employ textual analysis on bank annual reports (10-K reports). 
This approach allows us to identify culture for a substantially larger set of banks than we would 
using the survey measurement methods (Chatman and O’Reilly, 2016).11  
 Our textual analysis approach is motivated by the idea that the words and expressions 
used by members of a firm are artefacts of corporate culture that has been developed over time 
( Kramsch, 1998; Lazear, 1999; Levinson, 2003; Schein, 2010).12 To avoid any subjectivity, 
we follow Fiordelisi and Ricci (2014) and use a set of synonyms for each cultural dimension 
                                                     
11 Furthermore, this approach of using textual analysis on the bank’s annual reports allows us to capture the bank’s 
corporate culture rather than its climate. This is because an annual report contains information not only on the 
bank’s lending activities but also on all other activities of the bank, including its expansion strategies, mergers 
and acquisitions, and other business strategies. Therefore, by analysing the bank’s annual reports, we are able to 
capture all values that typify the bank (culture construct), and not just its lending (climate construct). In contrast, 
climate studies typically employ a more focused/specific set of constructs, such as employees’ perception about 
the safety of their work environment (Beus et al., 2010) or the service quality of the firm (Schneider et al., 2009). 
12 This text analysis approach offers some other advantages over other culture constructs, such as those that rely 
on annual rankings of companies or employee surveys (e.g., Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales, 2015). First, these 
surveys are restricted to a small subset of very large firms, making result generalisation difficult. Second, 
companies often pay to participate in the survey and therefore, have the incentive to manipulate the survey 
responses, resulting in significant measurement errors. 
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from those described in Cameron et al. (2006) and the Harvard IV-4 Psychosocial Dictionary 
(see Figure 2).13 For example, words like “fast, expand, performance, win” are to be associated 
with compete, words like “envision, freedom, venture” are to be associated with create, words 
like “cooperate, human, partner” are to be associated with collaborate and words like “monitor, 
competence, long-term” represent control. In Section 4.1, we augment these bags of words with 
additional bank-specific keywords and find consistent results. 
We first download annual (i.e., 10-K) reports from the Edgar website (www.sec.gov) 
for all listed US banks over the period 1993-2007 (1993 is the earliest year for which annual 
reports are available and 2007 is the final year the Dealscan version we have access to). We 
include one filing per bank per calendar year. We then parse the annual reports into vectors of 
words (excluding tables and exhibits). The score of each cultural dimension is the frequency 
of its keywords associated with that culture scaled by the total number of words in the annual 
report. For instance, if 634 compete-related keywords are mentioned in a 27,110-word annual 
report, the compete score would be 2.34%.  
We obtain four scores for each bank in each year, one for each cultural dimension. For 
instance, SVB Financial Group’s scores in 2002 for compete, control, create and collaborate 
are 3.62%, 0.72%, 1.01%, and 1.39% respectively. These scores tend to fluctuate over time 
and can be “contaminated” with noises specific to the market or industry in a given year. Thus, 
they do not necessarily reflect the long-term overarching culture that mature firms like banks 
in our sample are likely to have (Schein, 2009). 14 
                                                     
13 The Harvard IV-4 Psychosocial Dictionary is a commonly used source of word classification, in part because 
its composition is beyond the control of the researcher and the possible impact of research subjectivity is 
significantly reduced (Loughran and McDonald, 2011).  
14 As mentioned earlier, we conceptualise corporate culture based on Schein’s (2009) life-cycle theory which 
argues that mature firms often have an overarching corporate culture that accumulates over generations of 
managers. Therefore, such culture tends to be consistent and does not easily change because of temporary industry 
or market shocks. Since most banks in our sample are large and mature, each bank is operationalised as having a 
homogenous and consistent corporate culture. This cultural construct also implies that it is the differences in 
corporate culture across firms that explain differential corporate outcomes (e.g., Hofstede et al., 1990; Schein, 
1985). While theoretically sound, this conceptualisation is not without its limitations. We later relax this constraint 
and study within-bank variation in culture. 
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Therefore, we identify banks with a dominant culture in each dimension by 
transforming these raw scores into four time-invariant dummy variables – compete-dominant, 
create-dominant, control-dominant, and collaborate-dominant. Each variable equals one for 
banks whose respective score in that dimension is among the highest across all banks 
throughout the sample period. That is, a bank will be classified as, for instance, compete-
dominant if its raw compete culture score falls in the top quartile across all banks in at least 
half of its sample period. Our results are not sensitive to how these thresholds for cultural 
strength are defined.15   
3.2. Sample construction   
We obtain data on loan contracts from LPC-Reuters’ Dealscan database. Our loan sample 
includes all dollar-denominated loans made by US lenders to US borrowers. We hand-clean 
the lender’s name in Deaslcan to identify their holding company using a procedure similar to 
Schwert (2018). Some loan packages or deals consist of several facilities for the same 
borrower. Following Faleye and Krishnan (2017), we collapse the loan data to bank-borrower-
year level.  
We next merge the Dealscan data with the commercial banks and bank holding 
company call reports (FFIEC 031/041 and FR Y-9C) to obtain financial information on the 
banks. We then merge the dataset with our culture variables using the PERMCO-RSSD link 
table from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. In the final step, we merge the dataset with 
the Compustat database using the link table from Chava and Roberts (2008) to obtain financial 
information on the borrowers.   
                                                     
15 We also recognise that there could be occasions when a bank permanently alters its stable culture, such as when 
it has a new CEO with an entirely different management style (Nguyen, Hagendorff, and Eshraghi, 2016) or when 
it merges with another bank. Therefore, we later perform various sensitivity tests where we relax the thresholds 
and assumptions imposed in this baseline specification, and find that our results remain consistent. It is worth 
noting that a bank can be classified as having no dominant culture or having two dominant cultures, although the 
latter case is rare. In our sample, only 3 out of 78 banks are classified as having more than one dominant culture. 
Our results are not sensitive to these observations. 
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From an initial sample of 97 publicly-listed US banks16 extracted from the Dealscan 
database, we further lose nine banks due to missing financial data and 10 banks due to missing 
annual report data. Our final sample comprises 78 unique banks that lend to 5,482 unique 
borrowers between 1993 and 2007. Our final sample is in line with Faleye and Krishnan (2017), 
who identify 80 unique US banks from the Dealscan database. Table 1 presents various 
summary statistics: Panel A shows our sample selection procedure, Panel B shows descriptive 
statistics for the full sample, Panel C for different subsets of bank cultures, and Panel D presents 
examples of top-ranked banks in each dominant culture category. 
Table 2 presents the yearly breakdowns of our bank and loan samples. Panel A 
distinguishes banks according to their dominant culture (compete, create, control, collaborate) 
while Panel B distinguishes loans according to the borrower’s credit ratings (BBB and above; 
rated but below BBB; unrated) and bank dominant culture. As shown in Panel A, the 
breakdown of banks into different dominant culture remains stable over the sample period. The 
cultural category that has the most number of banks is compete-dominant and one with the 
least number of banks is control-dominant. This distribution is consistent with the popular 
narrative that competitive culture is more prevalent while control culture is less represented in 
the banking sector. It is also in line with the findings in the academic literature that the banking 
and finance industry tends to attract individuals with a higher propensity to take risks relative 
to other industries (Kristof-Brown, Zimmerman, and Johnson, 2005; Piasentin and Chapman, 
2006).  
Panel A also shows that many banks are classified as having no dominant culture. In 
these banks, all elements of the four dimensions co-exist but no particular dimension is 
dominating. Similar to Panel A, Panel B shows that the breakdown of loans into different 
                                                     
16 Many listed US banks do not lend to corporate borrowers and thus, are not listed in Dealscan. As a result, they 
are not included in our sample. However, in our analysis on mortgage lending decisions (Section 4.2.2), we are 
able to use the full sample of all listed US banks.  
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borrower’s credit ratings and bank’s dominant culture tends to be stable over the sample period.  
Therefore, our results are unlikely to be driven by events specific to an individual year over the 
sample period. 
 
4. Corporate culture and bank credit decisions 
Our first goal is to establish the link between the corporate culture of banks and the credit 
quality of their approved borrowers. To test our hypothesis, we run the following Probit model:  
 
Pr(Risky borroweri,j,t)
= 𝛷(𝛼0 + 𝛼1Compete-dominant𝑖 + 𝛼2Create-dominant𝑖
+ 𝛼3Control-dominant𝑖 + 𝛼4Collaborate-dominant𝑖 + 𝐂𝐎𝐍𝐓𝐑𝐎𝐋𝑖,𝑗,𝑡𝚪
+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑗,𝑡) 
(1) 
where i indexes banks, j indexes borrowers and t indexes years. The dependent variable 
Risky borrower is a dummy variable that equals one if the borrower does not have a long-term 
Standard and Poor’s credit rating or its credit rating is rated below BBB. 17 If a bank approves 
loans requested by sub-investment grade borrowers, it is willing to assume significant default 
risk. Therefore, this variable reflects the bank’s propensity to take risk in originating loans.  
The four key independent variables are the four CVF cultural dimensions. We include 
various control variables in all our estimations. To isolate the impact of bank culture from 
traditional determinants of a bank’s business models, we control for several bank 
characteristics. These include bank size, charter value, leverage and return on assets (ROA). 
Furthermore, we also control for several borrower characteristics, including borrowers’ size, 
market-to-book ratio, leverage and return on assets.  
                                                     
17 Credit rating is a readily observable proxy that measures a firm’s creditworthiness and predicts its likelihood of 
default. Relative to other proxies, such as borrowers’ size, profitability or Z-score, credit rating is more 
informative as it encapsulates borrowers’ quality from both quantitative aspects (e.g., financial health) and 
qualitative aspects (e.g., management quality, relationships with suppliers and customers, or any judgement filed 
against the borrower). Furthermore, credit rating is decided by an independent credit rating agency and thus, is 
difficult to be manipulated by borrowers. Our results are robust to alternative definitions of borrowers’ riskiness. 
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In addition, several loans characteristics are included: Ln (Deal amount), the natural 
logarithm of the loan’s amount and Ln (Loan duration), the natural logarithm of maturity 
period. We also control for qualitative factors that could affect lending outcomes: relationship 
lending, a dummy that equals one if the borrower has taken out a prior loan from the bank in 
the last three years; and same culture, a dummy variable that equals one if the borrower and 
the lender have identical dominating corporate culture.18 All regressions include year, 
borrower’s SIC-2 industry and borrower’s state fixed effects to control for differences in loan 
characteristics across time, industries, and states. Standard errors are clustered at the borrower-
level. 
Table 3 presents our baseline results, with the marginal effects (evaluated at the mean 
values) for the four cultural variables reported in squared brackets. Consistent with our 
hypothesis, we find that banks with a growth focus are more likely to have borrowers with 
poorer credit ratings, while those with a safety focus are less likely to do so. The effects are 
concentrated on compete- and control-dominant banks. The marginal effects in Column 5 
indicate that borrowers of compete-dominant banks are 3.0% more likely to be rated as risky 
(i.e., unrated or rated below BBB) compared to borrowers of banks with no dominant culture. 
Given that approximately 63.7% of the loans in our sample are made to sub-investment grade 
borrowers, this means that loans made by compete-dominant banks are 4.7% (=0.030/0.637) 
more likely to be risky. In contrast, loans made by control-dominant banks are 10.4% 
(=0.066/0.637) less likely to be risky. Furthermore, these magnitudes imply that bank culture 
has a greater impact on borrowers’ creditworthiness compared to other characteristics of the 
bank, including size (0.5%), charter value (2.7%), or profitability (2.4%)19. We do not find the 
coefficients for collaborate-dominant and create-dominant to be statistically significant. 
                                                     
18 We use the same textual analysis approach to identify the corporate culture of borrowers in our sample. 
19 Because our results are estimated using Probit, the estimated effects of culture variables on the propensity of 
risky lending are non-linear. The marginal effects reported are evaluated at the mean values of all independent 
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 The control variables have the expected signs. Borrowers of small, profitable and 
highly-leveraged banks are more likely to be risky, consistent with these banks adopting 
expansionary business strategies. This highlights the importance of controlling for these bank 
characteristics to separate a bank’s culture from characteristics reflecting its business strategies. 
It also suggests that bank culture has a first-order effect on risk-taking beyond any business 
model related characteristic.  
 
4.1. Robustness checks 
Table 4 reports various robustness checks on the relation between a bank’s culture and its 
borrower’s credit quality. Unless otherwise stated, all models use probit estimation with similar 
set of controls and fixed effects. Results in Panel A provide some validation of our bank culture 
construct. We start by relaxing the assumption that bank culture is time-invariant. For the 
purposes of comparison, Column 1 displays our baseline estimation results using time-invariant 
measures of corporate culture while Columns 2 and 3 display the re-estimation results using 
time-varying measures. In Column 2, we use Probit estimation and in Column 3, we use a linear 
probability model with bank fixed-effects to exploit only within-bank variations. 
As shown in Panel A, the coefficient estimates in Column 2 are largely similar to those 
in Column 1, albeit having smaller magnitudes. In contrast, except for the coefficient of 
compete-dominant that is marginally significant at 10% level, all coefficients for other culture 
variables are close to zero (Column 3). These results lend strong support to our 
conceptualisation of culture, implying that it is largely between-bank variations in culture that 
explain the heterogeneity in bank lending behaviour. The results are also consistent with 
Fiordelisi and Ricci (2014), who show that cross-sectional variations in corporate culture 
                                                     
variables. For brevity, we do not report marginal effects for control variables. These results are available upon 
request. 
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dimensions are related to management turnovers and successions. Additionally, the results also 
support the view that within-firm time-variation in culture is driven by noises rather than 
reflecting permanent shift in culture.20 
Columns 4-6 of Panel A show that our results are not sensitive to the specific way in 
which our cultural measures are constructed. In Column 4, we reclassify a bank as having a 
dominant culture when its raw score falls in the top decile instead of the top quartile. In Column 
5, we require that a bank’s score has to be in the top quartile for at least two-thirds instead of 
half of its sample period. In Column 6, we allow for the possibility that a bank’s culture may 
be associated with its CEO (e.g., Ogbonna and Harris, 2000) by classifying our time cultural 
measure per bank-CEO. As shown in Columns 4-6, our results remain unchanged.  
In Panel B, we address the concern that the cultural bags of words may omit important 
keywords that are specific to the banking sector. Taking the lead from Bianchi, Farina, and 
Fiordelisi (2016), we manually scan through the 2014 Financial Stability Board’s “Guidance 
on Supervisory Interaction with Financial Institutions on Risk Culture” for additional 
keywords that reflect bank culture. Our search identifies 10 extra keywords that are not 
included in the original bags of words: sceptic*, skeptic*, whistleblow, compliance, risk 
culture, risk management, risk appetite, risk information, risk limit, control functions.21 Banks 
that frequently mention these words in their annual reports are more likely to place heavy 
emphasis on control matters and as a result, are safer and have better loan quality (Bianchi, 
                                                     
20 As with other empirical works that explore heterogeneity across companies, there remains a possibility that the 
documented relations are driven by unobserved omitted variables that can explain both our culture variables and 
risk-taking. To address this issue, in unreported tests, we include additional control variables that proxy for bank 
balance sheet composition (Deposits/Assets, Loans/Assets, and Tier-1 Capital/Assets), loan portfolio quality (Bad 
Loans/Assets), off-balance sheet activities (Non-interest income/Total income), and financial derivative uses 
(Derivative Hedging/Assets and Derivative Trading/Assets). We also control for any remaining effect of bank 
size by including higher-power term of log total assets and size-decile fixed effects. All of our main findings 
remain robust to the additional controls. 
21 Similar to Bianchi, Farina, and Fiordelisi (2016), we consider both single (e.g., compliance) and both words 
(e.g., risk culture). 
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Farina, and Fiordelisi, 2016). Therefore, we add these keywords to the “control-oriented” bag. 
As shown in Panel B, our results using the newly constructed cultural variables remain robust.  
Panel C introduces additional control variables that reflect the compensation incentives 
and characteristics of the CEO. Column 1 controls for the fraction of bonus pay (bonus/salary) 
and the fraction of equity pay (equity/[bonus+salary]). Columns 2 also also control for various 
observable CEO characteristics: the age of the CEO, whether the CEO graduates from an Ivy 
League university, or whether the CEO has prior work experience as a top executive.22 Our 
results are robust to including these additional factors. 
By showing that the influence of corporate culture is not driven by these potentially 
confounding factors, the results in Panel C add to prior studies on corporate culture of financial 
service firms (e.g., Chatman and Spatero, 2005; Dwyer et al., 2003; Xenikou and Simosi, 
2006). Our findings imply that two seemingly similar banks (that is, banks that adopt similar 
business models, offer comparable compensation incentives to their CEOs, and hire CEOs that 
are similar in terms of demographics, education and career history) can have different lending 
behaviour depending on their corporate culture. This is in line with the calls from regulators to 
look beyond observable factors such as CEO pay in studying bank behaviour.   
Panel D presents various other robustness checks. First, instead of clustering the 
standard errors at the borrower-level, we cluster them at the bank-year (Column 1) and 
borrower-year level (Column 2). Second, in light of Greene’s (2004) concern that the test of 
coefficient significance could be distorted in Probit estimation when many fixed effects are 
included, we re-estimate our results using a linear probability model (Column 3). Furthermore, 
we recognise that loans can have different types and purposes, which may affect the probability 
of being approved. Following Giannetti and Yafeh (2012), we include in the regressions 
                                                     
22 Due to data limitation, we cannot control for the compensation incentives and characteristics of lower-level 
credit managers and officers in the bank. However, their pay and characteristics should mirror those of the CEO 
– the leader of the bank.   
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additional dummy variables for loan types and loan purposes (Column 4). Next, we exclude 
unrated borrowers from the sample and use a new dependent variable that equals one for sub-
investment grade borrowers (rated BBB and below) and zero otherwise (Column 5). 
Furthermore, to address the concern that our results are driven by a subset of very large 
banks, i.e., those perceived as “too-big-to-fail” and thus, are more prone to take risk (Stern and 
Feldman, 2004), we exclude the top-five largest banks (ranked by assets at the end of 2007)23 
from the sample (Column 6). Finally, in Column 7, we exclude loans made in the year after a 
bank completes an acquisition to prevent the possibility that information about M&A deals 
included in the annual reports may add noise to our cultural measures. Our results remain robust 
across all columns in Panel D.  
 
4.2 Endogeneity of bank culture measures  
4.2.1 Bank behaviour during the Russian Crisis of Fall 1998 
While our results are consistent with the view that the cross-sectional differences across bank 
culture explain the differences in a bank’s willingness to absorb default risk from borrowers, 
they are still subject to endogeneity concerns (see, for instance, Abdallah, Goergen and 
O’Sullivan (2015)).  First, the coefficient estimates can still be biased if there are unobserved 
factors that are correlated with both our measures of bank culture and borrowers’ quality. 
Second, since we can only observe the approved applications but not the rejected ones, our 
results could reflect the fact that borrowers do not randomly choose a bank to apply for loans 
and thus, there can be unobserved heterogeneity that simultaneously affects the borrower pool 
and our bank culture measure. To alleviate some of these concerns, we begin by examining 
                                                     
23 Our results are also robust to excluding the top-ten largest banks.  
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how the lending behaviour of US banks changes in response to an exogenous event occurred 
outside the US – the Russian Crisis of Fall 1998. 
This Russian Crisis starts with an announcement of the Russian government to default 
its sovereign debt obligations on 17th August 1998 (Kho, Lee, and Stulz, 2000). This was 
followed by the suspension of Ruble trading on 28th August 1998 and the massive capital flight 
from Brazil on 3rd September 1998. Many US banks that have dealings with these countries 
experienced significant losses, liquidity constraint and worsened stock performance. Gatev, 
Strahan and Schuermann (2004) show that bank stocks performed very poorly during this 
period, losing 10% of market capitalisation in a short period. 
Crucially, by making the adverse consequences of excessive risk-taking more salient, 
this event also generated a negative sentiment among unexposed US banks (Chava and 
Purnanandam, 2011). We hypothesise that, if a bank’s culture is unrelated to its lending 
decisions, all banks should exhibit similar changes in lending behaviour (or lack thereof) after 
the shock. In contrast, if a bank’s culture matters to its willingness to take risk in approving 
loans, we should observe heterogeneous reactions across banks with different cultures. 
Further, since this default event is exogenous to the US economy (Chava and 
Purnanandam, 2011), it also isolates a bank’s willingness to lend from a borrower’s decision 
to apply for a loan or its choice of lenders. Therefore, changes in lending behaviour after the 
event can be attributed to lenders and not borrowers.  
In a difference-in-difference setting, we examine changes in lending behaviour of banks 
with different cultures before and after the Russian default event. In line with the idea that the 
Russian event only produced a temporary, short-term negative sentiment rather than creating a 
permanent, long-term effect, we focus on short-term windows of three, four and five months 
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surrounding the event (i.e., from April 1998 to December 1998).24 To ensure that our 
coefficients pick up only the negative sentiment effect, we exclude all banks and borrowers 
that had direct dealings with Russia and Brazil during this period, i.e., those that had to bear 
the direct consequences of the event,25  and focus solely on the lending behaviour of unexposed 
US banks and borrowers.  
Our coefficients of interest are the interaction terms between the bank culture variables 
and Post-Russian default, a dummy variable that equals one for all months from August 1998. 
One concern is that the significance of the interaction terms in Probit estimation can be 
misleading. This is because the interaction effect in non-linear models is not a constant, but 
depends on the values of independent variables. Therefore, the marginal effects obtained from 
the coefficient of the interaction term may fail to reflect the true interaction effect between 
variables (Ai and Norton, 2003; Powers, 2005). To overcome this issue, we follow Fiordelisi 
and Ricci (2014) and adopt the methodology developed by Ai and Norton (2003) and Norton, 
Wang and Ai (2004) to compute the correct marginal effects and their standard errors. 
Table 5 reports the Probit estimation results. The marginal effects (calculated using the 
Norton approach) for the four cultural variables are reported in brackets. Across all three event 
windows, only the coefficient estimates for Compete-dominant*Post-Russian default are 
negative and statistically significant. Across all columns, the marginal effects indicate that 
compete-dominant banks cut their lending to risky borrowers by 2.7% following the default 
event. We attribute this response to credit officer’s career concerns. Our interpretation is that, 
after witnessing peer banks incurring large losses, credit officers at compete-dominant banks 
                                                     
24 In unreported tests, we also ensure that the parallel trend assumption is met. This assumption requires that in 
the absence of the shock (i.e., the Russian default event), the coefficient on the DiD estimator is zero. We calculate 
the changes in borrowers’ quality one, two, and three-year prior the shock and find no statistical difference across 
banks with different cultures.  
25 Following Chava and Purnanandam (2011), we obtain geographic segments of banks and borrowers from the 
Compustat Geographic Segments file and exclude those that report any business activity in Russia, Brazil, Europe, 
Eurasia, Eastern Europe, or South America.  
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(who tend to approve riskier loans) become concerned about their career and refrain from 
taking excessive risk in the short term.26 Specifically, they are concerned that if the loan 
portfolios they underwrite experience negative credit events, they would suffer negative career 
consequences (Gao, Kleiner, and Pacelli, 2017). In contrast, we do not find any statistically 
significant change in lending patterns of banks with other cultures. 
To confirm that our results are not driven by omitted factors, we construct a placebo 
test where the Russian default periods are falsely defined to be exactly one year before the 
actual default date. If omitted factors were to drive our results, we should continue to find 
significant results even under this inaccurate assignment. As shown in Column 4 of Table 5, 
all interaction terms are indistinguishable from zero. Overall, this set of results supports our 
conjecture that a bank’s culture explains its lending behaviour.  
 
4.2.2 Evidence from residential mortgage loans  
We further address the concern that our results could be driven by unobserved heterogeneity 
that simultaneously affects the borrower pool and our bank culture measure. This concern 
arises from the fact that in the Dealscan sample, we can only observe the approved applications 
but not the rejected ones. To alleviate this concern, we use an alternative sample of retail 
mortgage loans (instead of corporate loans) where the complete pool of loan applications can 
be observed.  
We obtain data on mortgage applications from the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act 
(HMDA) Loan Application Registry. Our measure of the bank’s risk-taking in making 
mortgage loans is Mortgage approval rate, the fraction of approved loans divided by the total 
                                                     
26 This idea could be seen as analogous to a traffic accident. When observing a fatal accident on the road, a reckless 
driver is likely to be concerned and drives more carefully. However, this effect is likely to be short-lived and 
would not permanently make him a cautious driver.  
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number of applications. Holding other factors constant, a higher approval rate indicates a higher 
level of willingness to consume default risk by a bank.  
To test our hypothesis, we regress Mortgage approval rate on our bank culture 
measures using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). The data are aggregated at the bank-county-
year level so that we can exploit both variations across banks and geographical regions. All 
models include county-year fixed effects, which control for omitted demand-side factors that 
could affect the lending behaviour of all banks within a given county-year. This allows us to 
compare loans originated in a given county in a given year by banks with different cultures. 
We also control for various bank characteristics (size, leverage, profitability, and charter value) 
and applicant characteristics (applicant’s income, fraction of female applicants, and fraction of 
minority applicants).  
As shown in Table 6, compete-dominant banks are associated with a 17% (=0.11/0.66) 
higher loan approval rate while control-dominant banks are associated with a 27% (=0.27/0.66) 
lower approval rate. The magnitudes of bank culture variables are higher than those of 
important controls such as bank size (2.0%) or bank charter value (2.3%). Overall, the results 
indicate that a bank’s culture affects its approval decisions, in addition to affecting its 
borrower’s credit quality.   
 
4.3 Bank culture and loan contract terms 
So far, we find that a bank’s culture affects its approval decisions, i.e., whether loans are 
approved and whether they are extended to marginal borrowers. This section investigates 
whether a bank’s culture also affects the terms in the loan contracts (i.e., loan covenants and 
loan spreads).  We use OLS to regress the number of covenants and loan spreads27 on the 
                                                     
27 The natural logarithm of drawn-all-in spread, which is the coupon spread over LIBOR rate on the drawn amount 
plus the annual rate. 
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culture variables. We include the same set of control variables and fixed effects as those in 
Equation (1). Table 7 reports the results.  
As shown in Columns 1 and 2 of Table 7, compete-dominant banks impose 1.5% 
(=0.034/2.33) fewer covenant requirements on their borrowers while charging their borrowers 
a 5.2% higher loan spread. This is consistent with their focus on revenue and growth and thus, 
choose to undermine post-lending safety and impose less stringent loan terms in exchange for 
higher loan spreads. In contrast, control-dominant banks require their borrowers to meet 7.3% 
higher covenant requirements, suggesting that these banks use loan covenants to reduce post-
lending uncertainty.28   
 Columns 3-6 further show that the differences in loan contract terms concentrate on 
the sub-sample of risky borrowers (i.e., unrated or rated below BBB). These are marginal cases 
that require banks to exercise more discretion and the ensuing loan outcomes are thus more 
likely to be affected by a bank’s culture. Collectively, our results indicate that a bank’s culture 
not only affects loan approval decisions but also explains the characteristics of the loan 
contracts. 
5. Bank culture and financial stability 
In the previous sections, we show that a bank’s culture affects the loan approval decisions and 
loan contract terms. However, looking at loan-level outcomes alone does not allow an overall 
assessment of the impact of a bank’s culture on its individual risk and its contribution to 
systemic risk. This section investigates whether a bank’s culture, through various lending 
channels documented earlier, affects its stand-alone risk as well as the bank’s contribution to 
the risk of the financial system. 
                                                     
28 Table 7 also shows that create-dominant and collaborate-dominant banks behave in a similar manner to 
compete-dominant and control-bank banks, respectively. This is consistent with the idea that bank lending 
behaviour can be identified along two broader dimensions – growth (compete and create) versus safety (control 
and collaborate). 
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5.1 Bank culture and loan performance 
We begin by analysing whether a bank’s culture affects the performance and risk of its loan 
portfolio. We use OLS to regress loan growth and non-performing loans on the culture 
variables:  
 
𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1Compete-dominant𝑖 + 𝛼2Create-dominant𝑖 + 𝛼3Control-dominant𝑖
+ 𝛼4Collaborate-dominant𝑖 + 𝐂𝐎𝐍𝐓𝐑𝐎𝐋𝑖,𝑡𝚪 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
(2) 
where i indexes bank and t indexes years. The dependent variables (yi,t) are Loan growth, the 
percentage change in total loans relative to the previous year; and Non-performing loans, the 
fraction of non-performing loans divided by total assets. Following Ellul and Yerramilli (2013), 
we control for various bank characteristics: bank size, bank leverage, bank ROA, bank capital, 
bank deposits, bank loans, as well as bank deposit concentration at the state-level (bank HHI).  
As shown in Table 8, compete-dominant banks enjoy a 2.6% faster loan growth relative 
to other banks while exhibiting a 0.9% higher fraction of non-performing loans. Therefore, the 
aggressive lending practices enable compete-dominant banks to enjoy rapid loan growth but, 
at the same time, these practices lead to greater losses caused by their defaulting borrowers. In 
contrast, control-dominant banks have a 1.2% lower fraction of non-performing loans, a reward 
for their caution when originating and setting up loan contracts.  
 
Given the costs associated with aggressive lending, why would some banks still 
maintain a compete-dominant culture and issue loans to risky borrowers? One possible 
explanation is that they may gain immediate benefits from risky lending, but only have to bear 
the costs when the industry enters distress. We explore how bank culture affects lending 
decisions and loan performance under different market conditions and find evidence that 
supports this explanation. 
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 Following Faleye and Krishnan (2017), we define industry distress periods as years in 
which the number of bank failures29 is greater than the sample median. We then partition each 
of the loan-level (borrower’s credit ratings) and bank-level (loan growth and non-performing 
loans) sample into “non-distress” and “distress” subsamples and re-estimate our analyses. 
Results in Table 9 demonstrate a sharp contrast in bank lending behaviour and loan 
performance of banks with different cultures across non-distress and distress time. During non-
distress time (Columns 1 to 3), compete-dominant banks continuously extend loans to risky 
borrowers and, as a result, enjoy a phase of fast lending growth without incurring higher non-
performing loans. However, when distress hits (Columns 4 to 6), compete-dominant banks start 
to incur non-performing loans, stop lending to risky borrowers and accordingly their lending 
growth comes to a halt.  Our evidence implies that compete-dominant banks only realise the 
costs of their risky lending behaviour when the industry enters distress. In contrast, control-
dominant banks incur a substantially lower fraction of non-performing loans in periods of 
distress. Thus, their safe lending practices during normal time pay off when distress hits.  
Overall, our results imply that the market condition is an important mechanism that 
affects the costs and benefits attached to certain types of bank culture in both the way banks 
behave and the consequences of their behaviour.  
 
 
5.2 Bank culture and bank’s contribution to systemic risk  
Bushman, Hendricks, and Williams (2016) argue that if a bank incurs non-performing loans 
and does not have sufficient capital buffer to absorb the losses, it may be forced to borrow 
heavily from the interbank markets and potentially creates large risk spillovers to the financial 
                                                     
29 Data obtained from the FDIC website (https://www.fdic.gov/bank/individual/failed/banklist.html)   
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system. This raises the possibility that a bank’s culture, in addition to influencing individual 
bank risk, also affects the stability of the financial system.  
  To test this hypothesis and the proposed mechanism, we run an OLS estimation model 
to examine the relation between a bank’s culture and its 1) Tier-1 capital, Tier-1 capital divided 
by total assets; and 2) ∆CoVaR, a measure of a bank’s contribution to systemic risk developed 
by Adrian and Brunnermier (2016). ∆CoVaR captures the estimated change in the Value-at-
Risk of all financial institutions when one bank’s Value-at-Risk changes from its normal to a 
distress state. That is, it measures the extent to which the financial system is closer to distress 
when one bank is becoming distressed. We include the same set of control variables and fixed 
effects as those in Equation (2). Table 10 reports the results.  
As expected, compete-dominant banks hold less capital (Table 10, Panel A). 
Previously, we also show that these banks incur a significantly higher proportion of non-
performing loans (Table 8). As a result, they produce greater contributions to systemic risk 
(Table 10, Panel B).30 In contrast, control-dominant banks incur a lower fraction of non-
performing loans, hold higher capital cushions, and therefore, their contribution to systemic 
risk is significantly smaller. Taken together, our evidence indicates that a bank’s culture not 
only influences its stand-alone risk but also produces large risk spillovers to the overall banking 
industry. 
6. Conclusion 
Over a short span of two years 2015-2016, The Federal Reserve Bank of New York organised 
three workshops and dedicated an entire issue of the Economic Policy Review on improving 
bank culture. The UK Financial Conduct Authority and the Dutch Central Bank echo the 
sentiment that bank culture lies at the heart of bank risk-taking behaviour and has the potential 
                                                     
30 Because a more negative value of ∆CoVaR indicates that a bank makes greater contributions to systemic risk, 
if banks with compete-dominant culture make greater contributions to systemic risk, the coefficient of compete-
dominant will be negative. 
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to undermine financial stability. Thus, studying how bank culture affects financial stability is 
a question of first-order importance. 
 Our paper provides the first micro-level evidence showing that corporate culture 
matters in many aspects of bank lending decisions, ranging from loan approvals, loan terms, to 
loan pricing. Specifically, we find that banks classified as “compete-dominant” are associated 
with risky lending practices – higher loan approval rate, lower borrower quality, and fewer 
covenant requirements. This link remains significant even after taking into account various 
corporate governance metrics that are found to influence risk-taking behaviour. Our findings 
imply that the piecemeal regulator responses around governance and executive compensation 
structure may not be sufficient in curbing a bank’s excessive risk-taking.  
 Linking bank culture to wider economic consequences, our evidence suggests that 
compete-dominant banks enjoy a higher loan growth in good times, but incur greater level of 
losses during industry distress. Combined with the evidence that they hold a significantly lower 
level of capital buffer, we postulate and find that these banks make a significantly greater 
contribution to systemic risk. Thus, our results show that not only does the culture of banks 
affects their own performance, but has an impact on the stability of the overall financial system.  
 Taken together, our results resonate the view of policymakers that bank culture indeed 
plays an important role in influencing bank behaviour and systemic stability. Thus, at the very 
least, it serves as a justification for regulators to make corporate culture their regulatory 
priorities and it is hoped that this work will lead to a better understanding on how corporate 
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Table 1: Summary statistics 
This table presents various summary statistics. Panel A shows the selection criteria for banks to be included in the 
sample. Panel B presents various summary statistics for the full sample, which comprises 41,313 loan observations 
(borrower-bank-years) made by 78 banks to 5,482 unique borrowers between 1993 and 2007. Panel C presents 
the sample means of all variables for different subsets based on bank dominant culture. Panel D shows examples 
of top-ranked banks in each dominant culture category. 
 
 
Panel A:  Selection criteria for banks to be included in the sample  
 
  Number of banks 
  
Publicly-listed US banks identified from the Dealscan database  97 
  
Less:  
Banks with missing financial data from Calls Reports  (9) 
Banks with missing annual reports data to measure culture   (10) 




Table 1: Summary statistics (cont.) 
 Panel B: Full Sample  Panel C: Sample means by dominant culture 
Variable Mean p25 p50 p75  Compete Create Control Collaborate No culture 
Dominant bank culture variables 
Compete-dominant 0.138 0.000 0.000 0.000       
Create-dominant 0.169 0.000 0.000 0.000       
Control-dominant 0.010 0.000 0.000 0.000       
Collaborate-dominant 0.071 0.000 0.000 0.000       
           
Bank characteristics 
Bank size 11.688 10.855 11.850 12.868  11.314 12.642 11.653 11.541 11.556 
Bank charter value 2.203 1.709 2.045 2.538  2.481 2.331 2.146 2.050 2.125 
Bank leverage 0.881 0.902 0.886 0.872  0.846 0.870 0.809 0.875 0.891 
Bank ROA 0.032 0.026 0.029 0.036  0.039 0.035 0.041 0.032 0.029 
           
Borrower characteristics 
Borrower size 7.699 6.477 7.582 8.918  7.599 7.959 8.143 7.404 7.691 
Borrower market-to-book 1.721 1.357 2.086 3.354  1.191 2.099 2.556 2.686 1.622 
Borrower leverage 1.947 0.980 1.612 2.781  1.721 1.986 0.695 2.338 1.914 
Borrower ROA 0.129 0.084 0.125 0.172  0.114 0.127 0.124 0.132 0.133 
           
Deal characteristics 
Sub-investment grade 0.637 0.000 1.000 1.000  0.675 0.571 0.575 0.723 0.635 
Ln(Deal amount) 5.851 5.017 5.861 6.746  5.710 5.979 5.998 5.658 5.872 
Deal maturity (months) 41.986 19.886 41.000 60.000  45.175 41.907 56.063 46.498 41.012 
Relationship lending 0.275 0.000 0.000 1.000  0.178 0.308 0.111 0.157 0.301 
Same culture 0.058 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.173 0.159 0.288 0.140 0.000 
           
#Observations 41,313  5,689 6,969 424 2,918 25,897 
 
Panel D: Top-ranked banks in each corporate culture quadrant  
Compete Create Control Collaborate  
PNC Financial Services  Wells Fargo  Valley National Corp National City Corp 
US Bancorp  Citigroup  UMB Financial Corp BB&T 
Corestates Financial Corp JPMorgan & Chase  Merrill Lynch & Co Inc.  Keycorp   
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Table 2: Annual breakdown of bank and loan samples 
Table 2 presents the annual breakdown of our bank and loan samples. Panel A distinguishes banks according to their 
dominant culture. Panel B distinguishes loans according to borrower’s credit ratings (rated BBB and above; rated below 
BBB; unrated) and bank dominant culture (compete, create, control, collaborate).  
 
Panel A: Breakdown of bank sample  
year total compete control collaborate create  unrated 
1993 38 4 1 3 7 34 
1994 43 6 1 4 7 38 
1995 46 8 1 4 7 41 
1996 49 10 2 5 7 42 
1997 48 12 2 4 7 42 
1998 52 10 3 6 7 43 
1999 54 11 3 6 6 45 
2000 50 11 3 6 4 41 
2001 47 11 3 6 3 38 
2002 43 9 3 5 5 35 
2003 43 10 3 7 3 33 
2004 41 9 2 5 2 34 
2005 34 7 2 4 2 28 
2006 29 6 2 3 2 24 
2007 23 5 0 2 2 21 
 
Panel B: Breakdown of loan sample  
   Split by borrower credit rating  Split by bank-dominant culture 




unrated  compete control collaborate create unrated 
1993 915  398 318 199  97 2 30 205 786 
1994 1440  718 338 384  148 4 52 333 1236 
1995 1732  681 371 680  193 5 56 359 1478 
1996 2636  721 667 1248  403 12 94 505 2127 
1997 3567  998 943 1626  641 43 181 671 2702 
1998 3276  867 915 1494  466 32 199 552 2579 
1999 3738  1280 997 1461  586 38 180 578 2934 
2000 3712  1473 953 1286  508 28 195 482 2981 
2001 3701  1676 859 1166  515 58 256 475 2872 
2002 3716  1711 876 1129  617 74 320 1,046 2705 
2003 3174  1272 917 985  678 86 375 434 2035 
2004 3436  1270 1063 1103  459 19 419 442 2539 
2005 3112  965 1095 1052  234 18 389 365 2471 
2006 2200  681 687 832  122 4 161 333 1913 
2007 958  296 399 263  22 0 11 189 925 
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Table 3: Bank culture and borrower’s credit quality  
This table reports Probit estimation results, where the dependent variable (Risky Borrower) equals one for unrated 
borrowers or those rated below BBB, zero for borrowers rated BBB or above. Marginal effects (evaluated at the 
mean values) for the four cultural variables are reported in squared brackets. Definitions of all variables are 
included in Appendix I. All models include year, borrower’s industry and state fixed effects. Robust standard 
errors are clustered at the borrower-level. t-value are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance 
at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Dependent variable: Dummy equals one for unrated borrowers or those rated below BBB   
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
Compete-dominant  0.088***    0.095*** 
 (2.657)    (2.670) 
 [0.027]    [0.030] 
Create-dominant   -0.006   0.025 
  (-0.229)   (0.881) 
  [-0.002]   [0.008] 
Control-dominant   -0.211**  -0.211** 
   (-2.352)  (-2.302) 
   [-0.066]  [-0.066] 
Collaborate-dominant     0.026 0.065 
    (0.657) (1.516) 
    [0.008] [0.020] 
Bank size -0.016** -0.019*** -0.020*** -0.019*** -0.017*** 
 (-2.529) (-3.019) (-3.385) (-3.124) (-2.792) 
Bank charter value -0.085*** -0.083*** -0.085*** -0.083*** -0.085*** 
 (-6.534) (-6.369) (-6.525) (-6.384) (-6.540) 
Bank leverage 0.001 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.001 
 (0.294) (1.265) (1.570) (1.235) (0.422) 
Bank ROA 7.926*** 8.683*** 8.764*** 8.638*** 7.820*** 
 (7.071) (8.017) (8.134) (7.990) (6.962) 
Borrower size -0.821*** -0.821*** -0.821*** -0.821*** -0.820*** 
 (-21.273) (-21.302) (-21.274) (-21.271) (-21.290) 
Borrower market-to-book -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007*** 
 (-2.895) (-2.890) (-2.889) (-2.890) (-2.895) 
Borrower leverage 0.004** 0.004** 0.004** 0.004** 0.004** 
 (2.560) (2.558) (2.552) (2.557) (2.553) 
Borrower ROA -2.523*** -2.523*** -2.522*** -2.521*** -2.517*** 
 (-6.545) (-6.540) (-6.538) (-6.537) (-6.533) 
Ln (Deal amount) -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 
 (-0.259) (-0.251) (-0.277) (-0.249) (-0.278) 
Deal maturity  0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 
 (6.258) (6.211) (6.315) (6.209) (6.336) 
Relationship lending 0.043* 0.041 0.040 0.042 0.044* 
 (1.664) (1.597) (1.552) (1.626) (1.700) 
Same culture  -0.036 -0.021 -0.015 -0.026 -0.043 
 (-0.529) (-0.307) (-0.223) (-0.388) (-0.593) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Borrower industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Borrower state FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 41,313 41,313 41,313 41,313 41,313 
Pseudo- R2 0.492 0.492 0.492 0.492 0.492 
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Table 4: Bank culture and borrower’s credit quality – Robustness checks 
This table reports various robustness checks. Unless otherwise stated, all models use Probit estimation and include 
similar controls as those in Table 3. Panel A performs the validity tests on our culture measures.  For comparison 
purposes, Column (1) displays our baseline estimation results using time-invariant measures of corporate culture 
while Columns (2) and (3) display the re-estimation results using time-varying measures. In Column (2), we use 
Probit estimation and in Column (3), we use a linear probability model with bank fixed-effects to exploit only within-
bank variations. Column (4) reclassifies the “dominating” threshold to be in the top 10%. Column (5) reclassifies 
the “time-invariant” threshold to be two-thirds of the sample. Column (6) reclassifies time-invariant dominating 
culture per bank-CEO rather than per bank. Panel B incorporates additional bank-specific keywords to the bags of 
words. Panel C controls for various compensation incentives and observable characteristics of the CEO. Panel D 
performs other robustness checks. Columns (1) and (2) report results where standard errors are clustered at the bank-
year and borrower-year, respectively. Column (3) reports results using OLS estimation. Column (4) includes 
additional loan type and loan purpose fixed effects. In Column (5), unrated borrowers are excluded, and the 
dependent variable equals one when borrowers rated below BBB. Column (6) excludes loans made by the top-five 
largest banks. Column (7) excludes loans made during transitional year after a merger. Definitions of all variables 
are included in Appendix I. All models include year, borrower’s industry and state fixed effects. Robust standard 
errors are clustered at the borrower-level. t-value are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Validity of culture measures 




















 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Compete-dominant  0.095*** 0.055** 0.009* 0.201** 0.072** 0.101** 
 (2.670) (2.475) (1.708)    (2.179) (2.231) (2.168) 
 [0.030] [0.017]  [0.063] [0.022] [0.032] 
Create-dominant  0.025 0.008 -0.000 -0.099 0.040 0.058 
 (0.881) (0.393) (-0.107)    (-1.084) (1.084) (0.817) 
 [0.008] [0.002]  [-0.031] [0.012] [0.015] 
Control  -0.211** -0.042* -0.005 -0.274*** -0.225** -0.237** 
 (-2.302) (-1.804) (-0.821)    (-2.862) (-2.408) (-2.081) 
 [-0.066] [-0.013]  [-0.086] [-0.070] [-0.077] 
Collaborate  0.065 -0.004 0.002 - -0.068* 0.067 
 (1.516) (-0.221) (0.374)    - (-1.667) (1.518) 
 [0.020] [-0.001]  - [-0.021] [0.022] 
       
Estimation method  Probit Probit LPM Probit Probit Probit 
Other controls  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Borrower industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Borrower state FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 41,313 41,313 41,313 41,313 41,313 41,313 
Pseudo-R2/R2 0.492 0.493 0.454 0.492 0.493 0.492 
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Table 4: Bank culture and borrower’s credit quality – Robustness checks (cont.) 
Panel B: Cultural measures using augmented bags of words  
  (1) 
Compete-dominant  0.076** 
 (2.125) 
   [0.021]    
Create-dominant  -0.015 
 (-0.402) 
 [-0.004]  
Control-dominant (Augmented)  -0.065* 
 (-1.772) 
 [-0.019] 
Collaborate-dominant  0.078 
 (1.557) 
 [0.021] 
Other controls  Yes 
Year FE Yes 
Borrower industry FE Yes 
Borrower state FE Yes 
Observations 43,313 
Pseudo- R2 0.538 
 
Panel C: Control for CEO compensation incentives and observable characteristics  
  (1) (2) 
Compete-dominant  0.092** 0.076** 
 (2.514) (2.035) 
 [0.028] [0.024] 
Create-dominant  0.024 0.026 
 (0.868) (0.900) 
 [0.007] [0.008] 
Control-dominant -0.347*** -0.335*** 
 (-2.815) (-2.729) 
 [-0.108] [-0.104] 
Collaborate-dominant  0.059 0.069 
 (1.381) (1.623) 
 [0.018] [0.021] 
Bonus/Salary  0.024 0.021 
 (0.719) (0.636) 
Equity/(Bonus + Salary) 0.004** 0.004** 
 (2.266) (2.233) 
CEO age  - -0.004* 
 - (-1.929) 
Ivy League - -0.025 
 - (-1.168) 
Experienced CEO  - 0.031 
 - (1.553) 
Other controls  Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes 
Borrower industry FE Yes Yes 
Borrower state FE Yes Yes 
Observations 40,351 39,551 
Pseudo- R2 0.492 0.491 
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Table 4: Bank culture and borrower’s credit quality – Robustness checks (cont.) 
 




















 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Compete-dominant 0.087** 0.087*** 0.013** 0.063* 0.119*** 0.107*** 0.096**  
(2.535) (2.855) (1.981) (1.821) (2.939) (2.955) (2.130) 
 [0.028] [0.028]  [0.019] [0.045] [0.032] [0.030] 
Create-dominant 0.028 0.028 -0.006 0.028 0.102*** 0.047 0.033  
(0.873) (1.188) (-1.096) (0.996) (3.230) (1.308) (1.121) 
 [0.009] [0.009]  [0.009] [0.039] [0.014] [0.010] 
Control-dominant -0.208* -0.208** -0.033* -0.312*** -0.213** -0.221** -0.221**  
(-1.656) (-2.362) (-1.845) (-3.374) (-2.087) (-2.436) (-2.354) 
 [-0.066] [-0.066]  [-0.096] [-0.081] [-0.067] [-0.069] 
Collaborate-dominant 0.044 0.044 0.009 0.052 0.043 0.060 0.070 
 (1.147) (1.316) (0.881) (1.186) (0.849) (1.370) (1.498) 
 [0.014] [0.014]  [0.016] [0.016] [0.018] [0.022] 
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Borrower industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Borrower state FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 41,088 41,088 40,481 40,997 26,350 28,704 33,836 
Pseudo- R2 0.513 0.513 0.523 0.527 0.431 0.521 0.490 
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Table 5: 1998 Russian default, bank culture, and borrower’s quality 
This table reports Probit estimation results where the dependent variable (Risky borrower) equals one for unrated 
borrowers or those rated below BBB, zero for borrowers rated BBB or above. Post-Russian default is a dummy 
that equals one for all months on and after August 1998. Column (1), (2) and (3) respectively report results using 
three-month (July 1998 to September 1998), four-month (July 1998 to October 1998) and five-month (June 1998 
to October 1998) windows surrounding the Russian default event.  Column (4) reports results of a placebo test 
where the Russian default periods are wrongly defined to occur exactly one year prior to the actual default date. 
Marginal effects for interaction terms between four cultural variables and Post-Russian default dummy variables 
(reported in squared brackets) are calculated as shown in Ai and Norton (2003) and Norton, Wang and Ai (2004). 
Definitions of all variables are included in Appendix I. All models include year, borrower’s industry and state 
fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered at the borrower-level. t-value are in parentheses. *, **, and *** 











 Placebo event 1 year 
prior to August 1998 
(4) 
Compete-dominant * Post-Russian default -0.085** -0.087** -0.086**  0.004  
(-2.204) (-2.091) (-2.124)  (0.097) 
 [0.027] [0.028] [0.028]  [0.001] 
Create-dominant * Post-Russian default -0.016 -0.027 -0.030  -0.062  
(-0.346) (-0.619) (-0.685)  (-1.505) 
 [0.005] [0.008] [0.009]  [0.018] 
Control-dominant * Post-Russian default -0.066 -0.091 -0.089  0.101  
(-0.498) (-0.692) (-0.711)  (0.635) 
 [0.020] [0.028] [0.028]  [0.030] 
Collaborate-dominant * Post-Russian default 0.041 0.046 0.054  0.005  
(0.699) (0.828) (1.050)  (0.080) 
 [0.013] [0.015] [0.017]  [0.002] 
Post-Russian default -0.005 -0.020 -0.017  -0.091* 
 (-0.100) (-0.461) (-0.413)  (-1.796) 
Compete-dominant 0.077** 0.058 0.065*  0.026 
 (2.268) (1.444) (1.747)  (0.660) 
Create-dominant -0.046 -0.021 -0.007  0.045 
 (-1.179) (-0.540) (-0.183)  (1.235) 
Control-dominant -0.015 -0.024 -0.013  0.097 
 (-0.140) (-0.229) (-0.124)  (0.664) 
Collaborate-dominant 0.012 -0.007 -0.013  0.027 
 (0.241) (-0.144) (-0.281)  (0.533) 
Other controls Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Borrower industry FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Borrower state FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Observations 1,198 1,582 2,003  2,003 
Pseudo- R2 0.703 0.641 0.604  0.491 
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Table 6: Bank culture and mortgage approval rate  
This table reports OLS estimation results where the dependent variable is Loan approval rate, defined as the 
number of approved loan applications divided by the total number of applications. The data are from the Home 
Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) Loan Application Registry and are aggregated at the bank-county-year level. 
Definitions of all variables are included in Appendix I. All models include county-year fixed effects. Robust 
standard errors are clustered at the county-level. t-value are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical 
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
 
Dependent variable: Mortgage approval rate      
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Compete-dominant 0.187***    0.188*** 
 (0.052)    (0.050) 
Create-dominant  -0.071   -0.078 
  (0.058)   (0.048) 
Control-dominant   -0.313***  -0.323*** 
   (0.075)  (0.085) 
Collaborate-dominant    0.017 0.015 
    (0.031) (0.032) 
Ln(Total Income) 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Fraction of female applicants -0.095*** -0.095*** -0.095*** -0.095*** -0.095*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Fraction of minority applications -0.222*** -0.222*** -0.222*** -0.222*** -0.222*** 
 (0.003 (0.003 (0.003 (0.003 (0.003 
Bank size -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.014*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Bank charter value 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Bank leverage -0.214*** -0.214*** -0.214*** -0.214*** -0.214*** 
 (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) 
Bank ROA -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
County-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 372,457 372,457 372,457 372,457 372,457 
R2 0.122 0.122 0.122 0.122 0.122 
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Table 7: Bank culture and loan contract terms  
This table reports OLS results of borrowers’ covenants and loan spreads on measures of the bank’s corporate culture. 
Definitions of all variables are included in Appendix I. All models include year, borrower’s industry and state fixed 
effects. Robust standard errors are clustered at the borrower-level. t-value are in parentheses.  *, **, and *** denote 
statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 




 Covenants Loan spreads   Covenants Loan spreads  
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
Compete-dominant -0.034* 0.052***  -0.043* 0.046***  0.009 0.018 
 (-1.900) (3.992)  (-1.871) (3.373)  (0.420) (1.254) 
Create-dominant -0.097*** 0.060***  -0.106*** 0.091***  -0.014 0.001 
 (-5.636) (5.039)  (-5.003) (7.173)  (-0.966) (0.037) 
Control-dominant 0.170** 0.026  0.134* 0.130**  0.101* -0.126 
 (2.574) (0.517)  (1.662) (2.492)  (1.903) (-1.528) 
Collaborate-dominant 0.050** 0.014  0.052** -0.011  -0.001 0.043 
 (2.438) (1.118)  (2.166) (-0.818)  (-0.025) (1.584) 
Bank size 0.003 -0.014***  -0.000 -0.017***  0.002 -0.004 
 (0.821) (-5.776)  (-0.073) (-6.324)  (0.720) (-1.353) 
Bank charter value 0.008 -0.047***  0.015 -0.039***  -0.009 -0.016*** 
 (1.053) (-9.843)  (1.616) (-7.426)  (-1.372) (-2.754) 
Bank leverage 0.004** 0.007***  0.008*** 0.009***  -0.004** 0.007*** 
 (2.366) (6.310)  (3.807) (6.972)  (-2.373) (4.195) 
Bank ROA -1.156 5.190***  -1.775** 4.865***  1.502** 1.283 
 (-1.535) (12.008)  (-2.463) (11.266)  (2.325) (1.491) 
Borrower size -0.118*** -0.233***  -0.085*** -0.153***  -0.165*** -0.081*** 
 (-7.473) (-17.840)  (-9.373) (-12.892)  (-6.040) (-6.798) 
Borrower market-to-book -0.002 -0.002  -0.002** -0.002  -0.002 -0.004*** 
 (-1.434) (-1.448)  (-2.531) (-1.338)  (-1.047) (-4.732) 
Borrower leverage 0.001* 0.001  0.001*** 0.001  0.009 0.010*** 
 (1.743) (1.511)  (2.738) (1.461)  (1.424) (4.100) 
Borrower ROA 0.337*** -1.742***  0.455*** -1.597***  -0.688*** -1.524*** 
 (2.676) (-16.827)  (6.620) (-16.550)  (-2.810) (-6.338) 
Ln (Deal amount) 0.060*** 0.024*  0.064*** 0.018  0.044* -0.005 
 (3.720) (1.788)  (6.618) (1.547)  (1.812) (-0.357) 
Deal maturity 0.009*** 0.003***  0.009*** 0.001**  0.001 0.001* 
 (12.020) (5.092)  (23.841) (2.362)  (1.316) (1.975) 
Ln (Spread) 0.513*** -  0.450*** -  0.360*** - 
 (21.710) -  (35.603) -  (8.967) - 
Covenants - 0.226***  - 0.146***  - 0.310*** 
 - (22.113)  - (16.424)  - (9.636) 
Relationship lending 0.025 0.023*  0.003 0.021*  0.009 0.009 
 (1.607) (1.771)  (0.277) (1.885)  (0.691) (0.691) 
Same culture -0.026 -0.031  -0.072*** -0.048**  -0.100** -0.100** 
 (-0.723) (-1.014)  (-3.098) (-2.147)  (-2.471) (-2.471) 
Year FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Borrower industry FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Borrower state FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Observations 24,750 24,750  18,137 18,137  6,613 6,613 
R2 0.394 0.280  0.547 0.426  0.519 0.519 
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Table 8: Bank culture and loan outcomes  
This table reports OLS results where the dependent variables are Loan growth, the percentage change in total 
assets relative to prior year (Panel A); and Non-performing loans, the fraction of non-performing loans divided 
by total assets (Panel B). Definitions of all variables are included in Appendix I. All models include year fixed 
effects. Robust standard errors are clustered at the borrower-level. t-value are in parentheses.  *, **, and *** 
denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
Panel A: Bank loan growth 
Dependent variable: Loan growth (%) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Compete-dominant 2.541***    2.562**  
(2.675)    (2.207) 
Create-dominant 0.520   1.996  
 (0.336)   (1.181) 
Control-dominant  -1.487  0.417  
  (-1.134)  (0.285) 
Collaborate-dominant   0.347 0.891 
    (0.433) (1.031) 
Bank size  0.240 0.034 0.010 0.092 -0.120 
 (0.856) (0.116) (0.037) (0.336) (-0.342) 
Bank leverage -62.945* -62.054 -58.257 -62.999* 0.588 
 (-1.744) (-1.637) (-1.498) (-1.672) (0.324) 
Bank ROA  -0.247 -0.052 -0.105 -0.050 -0.475 
 (-0.221) (-0.044) (-0.089) (-0.043) (-0.669) 
Bank capital 0.544* 0.553* 0.582** 0.560* -65.758 
 (1.936) (1.906) (1.997) (1.914) (-1.563) 
Bank deposits 1.941 0.165 0.257 0.431 0.686 
 (0.336) (0.030) (0.046) (0.076) (0.111) 
Bank lending -16.544*** -18.085*** -18.643*** -18.565*** -20.663*** 
 (-3.622) (-3.489) (-3.666) (-3.544) (-3.481) 
Bank HHI -1.622 -1.178 -1.307 -1.194 -2.161 
 (-1.066) (-0.775) (-0.852) (-0.784) (-1.413) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 317 317 317 317 265 




Panel B: Bank non-performing loans 
Dependent variable: Non-performing loans/Total assets 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Compete-dominant 0.927**    0.892**  
(2.344)    (2.058) 
Create-dominant  1.436   1.775*  
 (1.457)   (1.785) 
Control-dominant   -1.560***  -1.234**  
  (-3.244)  (-2.264) 
Collaborate-dominant    0.329 0.523 
    (0.712) (1.118) 
Bank size  0.801*** 0.652*** 0.653*** 0.737*** 0.660*** 
 (4.620) (3.747) (3.584) (4.146) (3.725) 
Bank ROA  -1.441*** -1.429*** -1.442*** -1.440*** -1.459*** 
 (-2.908) (-2.932) (-3.006) (-3.002) (-2.929) 
Bank capital 0.260 0.264 0.313* 0.267 0.308* 
 (1.503) (1.524) (1.802) (1.556) (1.753) 
Bank deposits -1.522 -1.882 -2.413 -2.164 -0.629 
 (-0.569) (-0.705) (-0.913) (-0.808) (-0.231) 
Bank lending 12.443*** 11.792*** 11.362*** 11.470*** 11.926*** 
 (13.889) (12.582) (12.664) (11.942) (12.249) 
Bank leverage -12.752 -14.999 -8.936 -14.920 -7.947 
 (-1.105) (-1.307) (-0.746) (-1.276) (-0.659) 
Bank HHI -1.101 -0.899 -1.000 -0.898 -0.902 
 (-1.454) (-1.172) (-1.336) (-1.183) (-1.213) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 290 290 290 290 290 
R-squared 0.437 0.435 0.436 0.429 0.451 
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Table 9: Bank culture and lending: Distress vs. Non-distress Periods   
This table reports the estimation results where we divide the sample into non-distress periods (Columns 1 to 3) and distress 
periods (Columns 4 to 6). Distress is defined as a dummy that equals one for years when the number of bank failures is 
greater than the sample median, and zero otherwise. Columns (1) and (4) use Probit model while Columns (2), (3), (5) and 
(6) use OLS. Definitions of all variables are included in Appendix I. All models include year, borrower industry and state 
fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered at the borrower-level. t-value are in parentheses.  *, **, and *** denote 
statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 















 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Compete-dominant 0.110*** 2.415** 0.104  0.054 1.134 1.207* 
 (2.839) (1.988) (0.173)  (1.541) (0.750) (1.749) 
 [0.028]***    [0.017]   
Create-dominant 0.037 -0.195 6.155***  0.000 3.298 0.130 
 (1.238) (-0.100) (4.965)  (0.011) (1.426) (0.130) 
 [0.009]    [0.000]   
Control-dominant -0.081 -2.545 -1.666**  -0.282*** -0.257 -2.217*** 
 (-0.658) (-1.316) (-2.438)  (-2.664) (-0.142) (-2.790) 
 [-0.020]    [-0.087]***   
Collaborate-dominant 0.009 -0.016 0.460  0.070 1.336 1.037 
 (0.218) (-0.014) (0.785)  (1.253) (1.104) (1.336) 
 [0.002]    [0.022]   
Other controls Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Borrower industry FE  Yes - -  Yes - - 
Borrower state FE Yes - -  Yes - - 
Observations 25,897 179 151  28,158 153 139 
R-squared 0.497 0.276 0.576  0.500 0.192 0.425 
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Table 10: Bank culture and systemic risk  
This table reports OLS estimation  results where the dependent variables are Tier-1 capital divided by total assets 
(Panel A) and CoVaR (Panel  B). CoVaR is developed by Adrian and Brunnermeier’s (2016), which is  the 
difference between the CoVaR conditional on a bank being in distress and the CoVaR conditional on a bank 
operating in its median state. Definitions of all variables are included in Appendix I. All models include year fixed 
effects. Robust standard errors are clustered at the borrower-level. t-value are in parentheses.  *, **, and *** 
denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Panel A: Bank capital   
Dependent variable: Tier-1 Capital/Total assets 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Compete-dominant -0.293**    -0.260*  
(-2.167)    (-1.771) 
Create-dominant 0.028   -0.049  
 (0.174)   (-0.274) 
Control-dominant  0.588***  0.471***  
  (3.813)  (2.816) 
Collaborate-dominant   -0.207 -0.230 
    (-1.181) (-1.270) 
Bank size  -0.366*** -0.349*** -0.332*** -0.353*** -0.355*** 
 (-5.867) (-5.443) (-5.239) (-5.660) (-5.576) 
Bank leverage -42.021*** -41.848*** -41.866*** -41.434*** -41.557*** 
 (-6.827) (-6.824) (-6.849) (-6.830) (-6.840) 
Bank ROA  0.590** 0.596** 0.611** 0.610** 0.619** 
 (2.304) (2.364) (2.446) (2.405) (2.407) 
Bank deposits 0.779 0.855 0.706 0.712 0.510 
 (0.803) (0.859) (0.713) (0.717) (0.513) 
Bank lending -0.801* -0.590 -0.393 -0.462 -0.477 
 (-1.758) (-1.336) (-0.884) (-1.024) (-0.976) 
Bank HHI -1.343*** -1.370*** -1.279*** -1.411*** -1.320*** 
 (-4.722) (-4.775) (-4.422) (-4.905) (-4.514) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 426 426 426 426 426 
R-squared 0.491 0.487 0.493 0.488 0.498 
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Panel B: Systemic risk   
Dependent variable = CoVar (x100) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Compete-dominant -0.167**    -0.155**  
(-2.471)    (-2.236) 
Create-dominant  0.000   -0.029  
 (0.001)   (-0.342) 
Control-dominant   0.200***  0.158**  
  (3.352)  (2.411) 
Collaborate-dominant    0.012 -0.003 
    (0.271) (-0.075) 
VaR 3.853* 2.097 3.174 2.100 4.549** 
 (1.903) (1.059) (1.510) (1.063) (2.175) 
Bank size  0.022 0.036* 0.042** 0.036* 0.030 
 (1.150) (1.878) (2.301) (1.946) (1.554) 
Bank leverage 3.614*** 3.688*** 3.085** 3.673*** 3.140** 
 (2.628) (2.628) (2.116) (2.604) (2.166) 
Bank ROA  0.218*** 0.213*** 0.219*** 0.212*** 0.223*** 
 (4.177) (4.137) (4.259) (4.142) (4.242) 
Bank deposits 0.010 0.013 0.006 0.013 0.005 
 (0.610) (0.766) (0.351) (0.777) (0.279) 
Bank loans -0.022 0.051 0.038 0.061 -0.039 
 (-0.073) (0.170) (0.126) (0.200) (-0.127) 
Bank capital -0.667*** -0.565*** -0.503*** -0.573*** -0.618*** 
 (-4.540) (-4.274) (-3.703) (-4.107) (-3.759) 
Bank HHI 0.256** 0.236** 0.236** 0.238** 0.250** 
 (2.361) (2.150) (2.152) (2.154) (2.285) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 378 378 378 378  378 
R-squared 0.481 0.478 0.484 0.478 0.495 
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Appendix I: Definitions of variables 
Variable  Definition Source 
Bank characteristics  
Compete-dominant  A dummy that equals to one if the frequency of keywords associated 
with compete culture is in the top quartile across all banks in more 
than half of the bank’s sample period 
Annual reports 
Create-dominant  A dummy that equals to one if the frequency of keywords associated 
with create culture is in the top quartile across all banks in more than 
half of the bank’s sample period 
Annual reports 
Control-dominant  A dummy that equals to one if the frequency of keywords associated 
with control culture is in the top quartile across all banks in more 
than half of the bank’s sample period 
Annual reports 
Collaborate-dominant  A dummy that equals to one if the frequency of keywords associated 
with collaborate culture is in the top quartile across all banks in more 
than half of the bank’s sample period 
Annual reports 
Bank size  Natural logarithm of total assets (BHCK2170) FR Y-9C 
Bank charter value Market value of equity divided by the book value of equity  CRSP,  
FR Y-9C 
Bank leverage Book value of liabilities divided by book value of total assets FR Y-9C 
Bank ROA (%) Earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) divided by book value of 
total assets (BHCK2170) 
CRSP, 
FR Y9-C 
Bank capital (%) Tier-1 capital (BHCK8274) divided by total assets FR Y-9C 
Bank deposits Total deposits (BHDM6631+BHFN6631 + BHDM6636 + 
BHFN6636) divided by total assets 
FR Y-9C 
Bank lending   Total loans (BHCK2122) divided by total assets FR Y-9C 
Bank HHI Herfindahl-Hirschman Index measuring the concentration of 
deposits at state level 
FR Y-9C 
Bank loan growth (%) The percentage change in total loans relative to prior year FR Y-9C 
Bank non-performing loans (%) Loans past due day 90 days or more (BHCK5525) and non-accrual 
loans (BHCK5526) divided by total assets 
FR Y9-C 
Var Value-at-Risk Adrian and 
Brunnermeier 
(2016) 
CoVar The estimated change in Value-at-Risk of all financial institutions 






CEO pay and characteristics    
Bonus/Salary CEO bonus compensation divided by CEO salary  ExecuComp, 
DEF14A 




CEO age The age of the CEO, measured in years. BoardEx 
Ivy League Equals one if the CEO is a graduate of an Ivy League university BoardEx 
Experienced CEO Equals one if the CEO has previous executive appointments   BoardEx 
   
Borrower characteristics    
Borrower size Natural logarithm of total assets (BHCK2170) Compustat 
Borrower market-to-book Market value of equity divided by the book value of equity Compustat 
Borrower leverage Book value of liabilities divided by book value of total assets Compustat 
Borrower ROA Earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) divided by book value of 
total assets (BHCK2170) 
Compustat 
Sub-investment grade A dummy equals one if the borrower has a sub-investment credit 
rating grade (i.e., unrated or rated below BBB) 
Compustat 
Same culture  A dummy equals one if the borrower and the lender have identical 
dominating corporate culture 
Annual reports 
   
Syndicate loan characteristics   
Ln (Deal amount) Natural logarithm of loan amount  Dealscan 
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Deal maturity  The number of calendar months between the loan origination date 
and loan maturity date 
Dealscan 
Covenants The number of financial covenants  Dealscan  
Loan spreadd Natural logarithm of the drawn-all-in spreads, which is the coupon 
spread over LIBOR rate on the drawn amount plus the annual rate. 
Dealscan 
Relationship lending A dummy variable that equals to one if a borrower has another loan 
from the same bank in the three-year period prior to the loan 
origination.   
Dealscan 
   
Mortgage loan characteristics  
Mortgage approval rate The number of approved loan applications divided by the total 
number of applications. 
HMDA  
Ln(Total income) The average borrower income for applications reviewed in each 
bank-county-year (excluded 1% tail) 
HMDA 
Fraction of female applicants  The number of applications from female applicants divided by the 
total number of applications reviewed in each bank-county-year.  
HMDA 
Fraction of minority applicants The number of applications from minority applicants divided by the 
total number of applications reviewed in each bank-county-year. 
Minority applicants include all applicants whose reported race is 
other than white. 
HMDA 
   
  
 50 





Figure 2: Bag of words (Fiordelisi and Ricci, 2014) 
Culture type Bag of words 
Control capab*, collectiv*, commit*, competenc*, conflict*, consens*, control*, 
coordin*, cultur*, decentr*, employ*, empower*, engag*, expectat*, facilitator*, 
hir*, interpers*, involv*, life*, long-term*, loyal*, mentor*, monit*, mutual*, 
norm*, parent*, partic*, procedur*, productiv*, retain*, reten*, skill*, 
social*,tension*, value* 
Compete achiev*, acqui*, aggress*, agreem*, attack*, budget*, challeng*, charg*, client*, 
compet*, customer*, deliver*, direct*, driv*, excellen*, expand*, fast*, goal*, 
growth*, hard*, invest*, market*, mov*, outsourc*, performanc*, position*, 
pressur*, profit*, rapid*, reputation, result*, revenue*, satisf*, scan*, succes* 
signal*, speed*, strong, superior, target*, win*  
Collaborate boss*, burocr*, cautio*, cohes*, certain*, chief*, collab*, conservat*, cooperat*, 
detail*, document*, efficien*, error*, fail*, help*, human*, inform*, logic*, 
method*, outcom*, partner*, people*, predictab*, relation*, qualit*, regular*, 
solv*, share*, standard*, team*, teamwork*, train*, uniform*, work group* 
Create adapt*, begin*, chang*, creat*, discontin*, dream*, elabor*, entrepre*, envis*, 
experim*, fantas*, freedom*, futur*, idea*, init*, innovat*, intellec*, learn*, 
new*, origin*, pioneer*, predict*, radic*, risk*, start*, thought*, trend*, unafra*, 
ventur*, vision*  
 
